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Abstract
In this paper, we propose opportunistic jammer selection in a wireless security system for increasing the secure
degrees of freedom (DoF) between a transmitter and a legitimate receiver (say, Alice and Bob). There is a jammer
group consisting of S jammers among which Bob selects K jammers. The selected jammers transmit independent
and identically distributed Gaussian signals to hinder the eavesdropper (Eve). Since the channels of Bob and Eve
are independent, we can select the jammers whose jamming channels are aligned at Bob, but not at Eve. As a
result, Eve cannot obtain any DoF unless it has more than KNj receive antennas, where Nj is the number of
jammer’s transmit antenna each, and hence KNj can be regarded as defensible dimensions against Eve. For the
jamming signal alignment at Bob, we propose two opportunistic jammer selection schemes and find the scaling law
of the required number of jammers for target secure DoF by a geometrical interpretation of the received signals.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication systems are vulnerable to eavesdropping because transmitted signals are broad-
casted over the air. Privacy and security start being treated as important issues. Traditionally, security
in wireless communications has mainly been addressed in upper layers and focused on computational
security such as cryptography. Recently, information-theoretic security in physical layer has received
great attentions because it enables perfect secrecy without the aid of encryption/decryption keys.
A typical model of a security communication system consists of three nodes – a transmitter (Alice),
a legitimate receiver (Bob), and a passive eavesdropper (Eve). Information theoretic security study was
opened by Shannon [1] with the notion of perfect secrecy. The wiretap channel model was first introduced
by Wyner [2] and secrecy capacity is defined in [3] as the maximum achievable rate of Bob preventing Eve
from obtaining any information. Positive secrecy capacity was shown to be achieved when Bob’s channel
is less noisy than Eve’s. For guaranteeing positive secrecy rate, artificial noise was additionally transmitted
from the transmitter [4]. The authors in [5] showed that the artificial noise can enlarge the secrecy rate
region in a symmetric interference channel. The secrecy issues were also studied in cooperative relay
systems [6]–[8]. In [7], [8], joint selection of relays and jammers was studied and opportunistic jamming
and relay chatting was proposed.
As an alternative measure to secrecy capacity, secure degrees of freedom (DoF) have popularly been
investigated. In [9], the secure DoF was found in an X network. For N-user Gaussian interference
channels, an interference channel with confidential message and an interference channel with an external
eavesdropper were studied in [10], [11], respectively. The secure DoFs for those cases were shown to
be N−2
2N−2
and N−2
2N
, respectively, while a half DoF per orthogonal dimension is to be achievable via the
interference alignment (IA) scheme [12], [13] in the absence of the secrecy constraint.
The multiuser diversity, exploiting multiuser dimensions by serving the selected users with good channel
conditions, can enhance the performance of wireless communication systems [14]–[19]. In many cases, the
multiuser diversity asymptotically achieves the optimal performance with considerably reduced channel
3feedback overhead. Recently, the opportunistic interference alignment (OIA) has been proposed by the
authors in order to resolve the difficulties of IA implementation [20]–[22]. In the OIA scheme, user
dimensions are exploited to align interfering channels; each transmitter has multiple users and selects a
single user having the most aligned interfering channels. The OIA scheme does not require the global
channel state information (CSI) and large computational complexity for precoding/postprocessing design.
A bit surprisingly, the achieved DoF by OIA was shown to be higher than that of conventional IA thanks
to multiuser dimensions. This result motivates new applications using the concept of OIA for security
communication systems.
In this paper, we propose opportunistic jammer selection (OJS) schemes for secure DoF. The basic idea
of OJS is to align jamming signals at Bob’s receiver via jammer selection, while the jamming signals
are not aligned at Eve. There is a jammer group consisting of S jammers, and Bob selects K(≥ 2)
jammers among them whose jamming signals are most aligned. Since we use jamming subspaces formed
by jammers, the selected jammers simply use independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) Gaussian
signals independent of Eve’s CSI as well as Alice’s. Denoting the numbers of antennas at Alice, Bob,
and Eve by Nt, Nr, and Ne, respectively, we focus on the cases that Nt+Nj ≤ Nr < Nt+KNj because
these cases require the jamming signal alignment at Bob’s receiver.
Although the jamming signals from the selected jammers can be aligned at Bob’s receiver, they are
randomly given to Eve and hence span KNj-dimensional subspace at Eve’s receiver. Because Eve requires
more than KNj receive antennas to obtain non-zero DoF1, we can regard KNj as defensible dimensions of
the system. For any number of Eve’s receive antennas, we can make Eve’s DoF zero by increasing either
the number of selected jammers K or the number of each jammer’s antennas Nj . On the contrary, the
jamming signals from the selected jammers can be aligned in Nj-dimensional subspace at Bob’s receiver
if the number of jammers goes to infinity. In this case, Bob needs only Nt+Nj receive antennas to obtain
DoF of Nt while Eve needs Nt +KNj receive antennas.
1Eve’s DoF is defined by lim
P→∞
(CEve/ log2 P ) where CEve is Eve’s channel capacity.
4Although both OIA and OJS exploit multiuser (or multiple jammer) dimensions to align interfering
(or jamming) signals, the problems are quite different. In OIA, each user in N-transmitter IC has N − 1
interfering channels jointly determined for each channel realization. Thus, the OIA problem is to measure
how much the N − 1 interfering channels are aligned at the selected user when each user has N − 1
random interfering channels. However, because Bob chooses K jammers among total S jammers in OJS,
the problem is changed to how much we can align the K jamming signals by directly picking each
jamming signal among S jamming signals.
There have been many studies on utilizing jammers for increasing secure DoF [23], [24], [26]. In [23],
cooperative jamming with structured jamming signals based on lattice coding was proposed for a Gaussian
wiretap channel. In multiple access fading channels, [24] proposed two ergodic alignment schemes for
secrecy communications – scaling based alignment (SBA) and ergodic secret alignment (ESA). In SBA,
users repeatedly transmit their symbols with proper scaling over several consecutive time slots. Then, the
signals are aligned at eavesdropper’s receiver and hence Eve’s DoF becomes zero. In ESA, the concept of
ergodic IA [25] was extended to secrecy communications. In [26], cooperative jammers were exploited to
increase secure DoF in a Gaussian wiretap channel, where transmitter and cooperative jammers send jointly
designed signals according to channel conditions. Contrary to the previous works, in our proposed OJS
schemes, the selected jammers adopt i.i.d Gaussian signals oblivious to CSI. Furthermore, any precoding
design at Alice is not required for the proposed scheme. Because the role of CSI is only for constructing
the wiretap code, the proposed OJS scheme does not suffer from secure DoF degradation even with only
Bob’s CSI, which is a practical advantage of the proposed OJS scheme.
Our contributions are summarized below.
• Using a geometrical interpretation of jamming signals, we define an alignment measure representing
how well the selected jamming signals are aligned at Bob’s receiver and quantify the achievable
alignment measure via jammer selection for the total number of jammers.
• To obtain the secure DoF, we propose two jammer selection schemes – the minimum DoF loss
5jammer selection and the subspace-based jammer selection. Using the proposed jammer selection
schemes, we show that Bob can achieve the secure DoF of d ∈ (0, Nt] when the number of jammers
is scaled by S ∝ P dNj/2 where P is transmit power.
• We show that the same secure DoF is achievable with secrecy outage probability ǫ by the proposed
OJS with only Bob’s CSI.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the system model. The achievable
secure DoF via opportunistic jammer selection is analyzed in Section III. We geometrically interpret the
jamming channels in Section IV, and propose opportunistic jammer selection schemes in Section V. In
Section VI, we derive the scaling laws of the required number of jammers for target secure DoF. Numerical
results are presented in Section VII, followed by concluding remarks in Section VIII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Our system model is depicted in Fig. 1. Alice wants to send secret messages to Bob, and a passive
eavesdropper, Eve, overhears the secret messages. The numbers of antennas at Alice, Bob, and Eve
are denoted by Nt, Nr, and Ne, respectively. To prevent Eve’s eavesdropping, there is a jammer group
consisting of S jammers with Nj antennas each, and Bob selects K (K ≥ 2) jammers among them. The
selected jammers simultaneously transmit i.i.d. Gaussian signals independent of Alice’s message so that
the jamming signals interfere with Bob as well as Eve.
We assume that Alice and the selected jammers fully utilize their antenna dimensions, i.e., Alice and
each selected jammer transmit Nt and Nj streams, respectively. We also assume that Eve has more antennas
than each jammer, i.e., Ne > Nj , and Bob selects K jammers such that KNj ≥ Ne. We consider the
cases that Bob has Nr receive antennas such that Nt +Nj ≤ Nr < Nt +KNj . If Bob has a less number
of receive antennas than the total number of antennas at Alice and a jammer, i.e., Nr < Nt + Nj , Bob
cannot obtain DoF of Nt; otherwise, if the number of Bob’s antennas is larger than or equal to the total
number of Alice and all selected jammers’ antennas, i.e., Nr ≥ Nt +KNj , Bob can easily achieve DoF
of Nt with zero-forcing like schemes.
6Since Bob knows the jamming channel from each jammer, we assume that Bob selects K jammers in
the jammer group with only its own CSI. It is also assume that Eve has its own CSI from the selected
jammers, which is independent of Bob’s CSI. For wiretap code construction at Alice, we firstly assume
that Alice knows Bob’s achievable rate and Eve’s channel capacity after Bob’s jammer selection. Then,
in Section VI-A we show that the required jammer scaling for the target secure DoF is the same even in
practical scenarios that Alice has no information about Eve.
In this paper, we adopt the quasi-static fading channel model [27], where the coherent interval is longer
than the jammer selection procedure and the length of a codeword. That is, the channel coefficients remain
constant over the transmission of an entire codeword but each codeword suffers from an independent
channel.
Let s1, . . . , sK be the indices of the K selected jammers in the jammer group. Then, the received signal
of Bob, y ∈ CNr×1, is given by
y = H0x0 +
K∑
k=1
Hskxsk + n, (1)
where H0 ∈ CNr×Nt is the channel matrix from Alice to Bob, and Hsk ∈ CNr×Nj is the channel matrix
from the skth jammer to Bob. We assume that all elements of the channel matrices are i.i.d. complex
Gaussian random variables with zero mean and unit variance. The vectors x0 ∈ CNt×1 and xsk ∈ CNj×1
are the transmit signal from Alice and the skth jammer, respectively, satisfying E[x0x†0] = (P/Nt)INt and
E[xskx
†
sk
] = (P/Nj)INj , where (·)† denotes conjugate transpose, P is total transmit power budget at each
node, and INt is an Nt×Nt identity matrix. n ∈ CNr×1 is a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian noise
vector such that n ∼ CN (0, INr).
From (1), the capacity of Bob becomes
CBob , log2
∣∣∣∣∣∣INr +
P
Nt
H0H
†
0
(
INr +
P
Nj
K∑
k=1
HskH
†
sk
)−1∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
In this paper, we assume that Bob uses the postprocessing matrix V† ∈ CNt×Nr such that V†V = INt to
7suppress the jamming signals. After postprocessing, the received signal at Bob is given by
V†y = V†H0x0 +
K∑
k=1
V†Hskxsk +V
†n,
and the achievable rate of Bob becomes
RBob , log2
∣∣∣INt +V† ( PNtH0H†0 +∑Kk=1 PNjHskH†sk
)
V
∣∣∣∣∣∣INt + PNj ∑Kk=1V†HskH†skV
∣∣∣ .
On the other hand, the received signal at Eve denoted by y¯ ∈ CNe×1 becomes
y¯ = G0x0 +
K∑
k=1
Gskxsk + n¯,
where G0 ∈ CNe×Nt and Gsk ∈ CNe×Nj are the channel matrices from Alice and from the selected
jammer sk, respectively, whose elements are i.i.d. complex Gaussian random variables with zero mean
and unit variance. Also, n¯ ∈ CNe×1 is a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian noise vector such that
n¯ ∼ CN (0, INe). Thus, the channel capacity of Eve is given by
CEve , log2
∣∣∣∣∣∣INe +
P
Nt
G0G
†
0
(
INe +
P
Nj
K∑
k=1
GskG
†
sk
)−1∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (2)
Therefore, the secrecy rate [RBob − CEve]+ is achievable at Bob for each channel realization through the
Wyner’s encoding scheme [2], [28] with nested code structure, where [·]+ denotes max(·, 0). In an average
sense, we obtain the secrecy rate and the secure DoF given, respectively, by
Secrecy rate = E
{
[RBob − CEve]
+
}
,
Secure DoF = E
{
lim
P→∞
[RBob − CEve]+
log2 P
}
. (3)
III. ACHIEVABLE SECURE DOF VIA OPPORTUNISTIC JAMMER SELECTION
A. The Concept of Opportunistic Jammer Selection
The purpose of the opportunistic jammer selection is to obtain the secure DoF between Alice and Bob.
To hinder Eve’s eavesdropping, Bob selects K jammers among S jammers in the jammer group. Since
the jamming signals also interfere with Bob, appropriate jammers should be selected from the jammer
group. Using the IA concept, the subspace spanned by multiple Nj-dimensional signals can be reduced
8minimally in the Nj-dimensional subspace. It was also shown in [20]–[22] that interference alignment
can be achieved by opportunistic user selection if the number of users goes to infinity.
Since each jammer has Nj transmit antennas, each jamming signal spans Nj-dimensional subspace in
CNr at Bob’s receiver. Thus, opportunistically selected jamming signals can be aligned in Nj-dimensional
subspace if the selection pool size S goes to infinity. If the jamming signals are aligned in (Nr − Nt)-
dimensional subspace at Bob’s receiver, Bob can use the residual Nt dimensions for Alice’s signals. The
concept of the opportunistic jammer selection is illustrated in Fig. 2. In the jammer group, Bob selects K
jammers whose channels are most aligned. When there are an infinite number of jammers (i.e., S =∞),
the jamming signals can be perfectly aligned in Nj-dimensional subspace at Bob’s receiver by proper
jammer selection. In this case, Nt + Nj antennas are enough for Bob to achieve DoF of Nt. At Eve’s
receiver, on the other hand, the jamming signals are not aligned and span KNj-dimensional subspace. This
is because the jammer selection of Bob is independent of Eve so that it corresponds to a random jammer
selection to Eve. Since KNj-dimensional subspace at Eve’s receiver is corrupted by the jamming signals
from the selected K jammers, KNj can be interpreted as defensible dimensions of the security system
against eavesdropping. If the number of Eve’s receive antenna is less than KNj , Eve cannot achieve
any DoF; Eve needs Nt +KNj receive antennas for DoF of Nt. Thus, the jamming system is designed
according to the target defensible dimensions. Since Eve has Ne antennas, we require the defensible DoF
larger than or equal to Ne, i.e., KNj ≥ Ne to yield the zero DoF at Eve.
B. Secure DoF via Opportunistic Jammer Selection
In this section, we find the achievable secure DoF via OJS. We recall the channel capacity of Eve given
in (2):
CEve , log2
∣∣∣∣∣∣INe +
P
Nt
G0G
†
0
(
INe +
P
Nj
K∑
k=1
GskG
†
sk
)−1∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
9Then, it can be decomposed into C+Eve and C−Eve such that CEve = C+Eve − C−Eve given by
C+Eve , log2
∣∣∣∣∣INe + PNtG0G†0 +
P
Nj
K∑
k=1
GskG
†
sk
∣∣∣∣∣
C−Eve , log2
∣∣∣∣∣INe + PNj
K∑
k=1
GskG
†
sk
∣∣∣∣∣ .
In the above equations, the matrix
∑K
k=1GskG
†
sk
(= [Gs1 , . . . ,GsK ][Gs1, . . . ,GsK ]
†) becomes an Ne×Ne
Wishart matrix with KNj (≥ Ne) DoF, and hence it has Ne non-zero eigenvalues with probability one.
From this fact, we can easily show that Eve’s DoF becomes zero for each channel realization such that
lim
P→∞
CEve
log2 P
= lim
P→∞
C+Eve − C
−
Eve
log2 P
= Ne −Ne = 0. (4)
This implicates that the achievable DoF at Bob directly becomes the secure DoF.
To find the secure DoF at Bob, we decompose the average achievable rate at Bob, i.e., E [RBob], into
R+Bob and R−Bob such that E [RBob] = R+Bob −R−Bob, which are given, respectively, by
R+Bob = E log2
∣∣∣∣∣INt +V†
(
P
Nt
H0H
†
0 +
P
Nj
K∑
k=1
HskH
†
sk
)
V
∣∣∣∣∣
R−Bob = E log2
∣∣∣∣∣INt + PNj
K∑
k=1
V†HskH
†
sk
V
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Then, similar to (4), the achievable DoF of Bob becomes
E
{
lim
P→∞
RBob
log2 P
}
= lim
P→∞
R+Bob −R
−
Bob
log2 P
= Nt − lim
P→∞
R−Bob
log2 P
. (5)
In (4), we show that Eve’s DoF becomes zero for each channel realization. By plugging (4) and (5) in
(3), we obtain the achievable secure DoF via opportunistic jammer selection:
Secure DoF = Nt − lim
P→∞
R−Bob
log2 P
. (6)
Therefore, the achievable secure DoF depends on how much the DoF loss from jamming signals is reduced
at Bob. In the latter part of the paper, we set the target secure DoF d ∈ (0, Nt] and find the number of
required jammers to obtain the target secure DoF.
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IV. GEOMETRIC INTERPRETATIONS
A. Geometric Interpretations of Jamming Channels
The Grassmann manifold GNr,Nj (C) is set of all Nj-dimensional subspaces in CNr [33]–[35]. Since
each jammer and Bob have Nj and Nr antennas, respectively, the channel matrix from each jammer
to Bob constructs an Nj-dimensional subspace in CNr . Let Hk be the subspace formed by the channel
matrix from the kth jammer to Bob, i.e., Hk. Then, it belongs to the Grassmann manifold GNr ,Nj(C),
i.e., Hk ∈ GNr ,Nj(C). Each subspace can be represented by the generator matrix whose columns are
orthonormal and span the same subspace. If we denote the generator matrix of Hk by H˜k ∈ CNr×Nj ,
it is satisfied that H˜†kH˜k = INj and span(H˜k) = span(Hk) = Hk. Since Bob has more antennas than
Alice, Bob can partly suppress the jamming signals using the residual antenna dimensions. In our case,
the Nj-dimensional jamming signals should be aligned in (Nr −Nt)-dimensional subspace to obtain the
secure DoF of Nt.
The distance between two subspaces can be defined in many ways. The chordal distance is one of
the most widely used ones. Let Q ∈ GNr ,Nr−Nt(C) be an arbitrary (Nr − Nt)-dimensional subspace and
Q ∈ CNr×(Nr−Nt) be its generator matrix such that Q†Q = INr−Nt . Then, the squared chordal distance
between Hk ∈ GNr ,Nj(C) and Q ∈ GNr ,Nr−Nt(C) denoted by d2c(Hk,Q) is calculated from the generator
matrices of them such that
d2c(Hk,Q) , min(Nj , Nr −Nt)− tr(H˜kH˜
†
kQQ
†)
(a)
= Nj − tr(H˜
†
kQQ
†H˜k), (7)
where the equality (a) holds because Nr ≥ Nt +Nj and tr(AB) = tr(BA). Note that H˜kH˜†k and QQ†
are the projection matrices onto the subspaces Hk and Q, respectively. See [29] for more details on the
chordal distance.
Lemma 1. The squared chordal distance between Hk and Q is equivalent to
d2c(Hk,Q) = tr((Q
⊥)†H˜kH˜
†
k(Q
⊥)), (8)
11
where Q⊥ ∈ CNr×Nt is the generator matrix of the orthogonal complement subspace of Q denoted by
Q⊥ ∈ GNr ,Nt(C).
Proof. To prove the equivalence between (7) and (8), it is enough to show tr(Q†H˜kH˜†kQ)+tr((Q⊥)†H˜kH˜†k(Q⊥)) =
Nj . Since the concatenated matrix [Q,Q⊥] is an unitary matrix such that
[Q,Q⊥][Q,Q⊥]† = [Q,Q⊥]†[Q,Q⊥] = INr ,
it is satisfied that
tr(Q†H˜kH˜
†
kQ) + tr((Q
⊥)†H˜kH˜
†
k(Q
⊥))
= tr([Q,Q⊥]†H˜kH˜
†
k[Q,Q
⊥])
(a)
= tr(H˜†k[Q,Q
⊥][Q,Q⊥]†H˜k) = Nj ,
where the equality (a) holds from tr(AB) = tr(BA).
Lemma 2. Any full rank precoding matrix at each jammer cannot change the jamming subspace at Bob’s
receiver. For example, when the kth jammer uses an arbitrary precoding matrix U ∈ CNj×Nj of rank Nj ,
it is satisfied that span(Hk) = span(HkU) = Hk.
Proof. Since both Hk and U are the matrices of rank Nj , so is HkU. Intuitively, the columns of HkU
are linear combinations of the columns of Hk so that they will span the same subspace. Formally, we can
show d2c(Hk,HkU) = 0, but it is trivial.
As stated in Lemma 2, each jamming channel forms an unique subspace invariant to any full rank
precoding matrix. Since there are total S jammers, we have S jamming subspaces H1, . . . ,HS such that
{H1, . . . ,HS} ⊂ GNr ,Nj(C). Note that each jamming subspace is isotropic in CNr and independent of each
other because all jamming channels have the elements of i.i.d. complex Gaussian random variables. A
graphical interpretation is given in Fig. 3. In Fig. 3, each point on the sphere surface is an Nj-dimensional
subspace represented by its generator matrix, while the surface of the sphere is an Nr-dimensional space,
i.e., CNr , which is set of all Nj-dimensional subspaces. Since we should select K jammers among S
jammers, we select K points out of S points (jamming subspaces) on the sphere.
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B. Alignment Measure among K Jamming Subspaces
Now, our aim is to select K jammers whose jamming subspaces are most aligned in an (Nr − Nt)-
dimensional subspace. For jammer selection, we define an alignment measure to quantify how well K
jamming subspaces are aligned and find the relationship between the alignment measure and jammer group
size (i.e., S). The alignment measure is based on the mini-max distance of the selected jamming subspaces
from an (Nr−Nt)-dimensional subspace. For example, the alignment measure of the K subspaces formed
by K jammers indexed from 1 to K, i.e., H1, . . . ,HK , is defined by
q(H1, . . . ,HK) , min
Q∈GNr,Nr−Nt (C)
max
k∈[K]
dc(Hk,Q), (9)
where [K] = {1, . . . , K}. If q(H1, . . . ,HK) = 0, there exists Q ∈ GNr ,Nr−Nt(C) such that
dc(H1,Q) = dc(H2,Q) = · · · = dc(HK ,Q) = 0,
which means that the K jamming subspaces are perfectly aligned in an (Nr−Nt)-dimensional subspace.
Otherwise, if q(H1, . . . ,HK) = δ, there exist Q ∈ GNr ,Nr−Nt(C) such that
dc(Hk,Q) ≤ δ ∀k ∈ [K],
which means the K subspaces are aligned in an (Nr−Nt)-dimensional subspace within distance δ. Since
there are S jammers in our problem, we can select K jammers (i.e., jamming subspaces) with the smallest
alignment measure among S jammers. Thus, the alignment measure for the selected jammers becomes
min
{s′1,...,s
′
K
}⊂[S]
q(Hs′1 , . . . ,Hs′K).
As the number of jammers increases, we can select more-aligned jamming subspaces. Therefore, the
question of interest is how small we can make the alignment measure of the K jamming subspaces by
opportunistic jammer selection for a given number of total jammers S. To answer this question, we adopt
subspace quantization theory [33]–[37].
Suppose that we quantize an arbitrary Nj-dimensional subspace into one of M (Nr −Nt)-dimensional
subspaces. We define a subspace codebook Q , {Q1, . . . ,QM} comprised of M (Nr −Nt)-dimensional
13
subspaces such that |Q| = M and Q ⊂ GNr ,Nr−Nt(C). For the mth subspace (or codeword), i.e., Qm, we
define a metric ball with radius δ:
B(Qm, δ) , {P ∈ GNr ,Nj(C) : dc(Qm,P) ≤ δ},
as a set of Nj-dimensional subspaces within a distance δ from the (Nr −Nj)-dimensional subspace Qm.
Generally, the performance of a codebook is measured by two important parameters – the packing
radius and the covering radius. The packing radius of Q denoted by δp(Q) is the maximum radius of
each metric ball which is non-overlapped such that [33]–[35]
δp(Q) , max{δ : B(Qi, δ) ∩B(Qj , δ) = ∅ ∀i 6= j}.
The covering radius of Q denoted by δc(Q) is the minimum radius of the metric ball covering whole
space such that [36], [37]
δc(Q) , min{δ : B(Q1, δ) ∪ · · · ∪B(QM , δ) = C
Nr}. (10)
A graphical representation of the packing and the covering radii of a codebook are given in Fig. 4(a)
and Fig. 4(b), respectively. Obviously, the covering radius is always larger than or equal to the packing
radius, i.e., δp(Q) ≤ δc(Q). Since the union of M metric balls with the covering radius δc(Q) is CNr ,
any jamming subspace will be contained at least one of the M metric balls with the covering radius. This
fact leads to Remark 1.
Remark 1 (Pigeon hole principle). When there are S = (K − 1)M + 1 jamming subspaces, at least K
subspaces are contained in the same metric ball among B(Q1, δc(Q)), . . . , B(QM , δc(Q)). The illustration
is given in Fig. 5.
Now, we consider two optimal codebooks of size M ; one maximizes the packing radius, and the other
minimizes the covering radius. Although the optimal codebooks are not unique, the maximum packing
radius and the minimum covering radius will be uniquely determined for given codebook size. With
a slight abuse of notation, we denote the maximum packing radius and the minimum covering radius
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obtained from the codebooks of size M by δ⋆p(M) and δ⋆c (M), respectively, such that
δ⋆p(M) = max
Q⊂GNr,Nr−Nt
(C)
|Q|=M
δp(Q)
δ⋆c (M) = min
Q⊂GNr,Nr−Nt
(C)
|Q|=M
δc(Q).
Unfortunately, however, the exact values of the optimal packing and covering radii are unknown because
finding them are NP-hard problems. Instead, the optimal packing radius δ⋆p(M) is shown to be [33]
κ1M
− 1
NtNj (1 + o(1)) ≤ δ⋆p(M) ≤ κ2M
− 1
NtNj (1 + o(1)), (11)
where κ1 and κ2 are constants invariant to M (see [33] for details).2 It is also shown that the main terms
of both upper and lower bounds are quite accurate estimates of the optimal packing radius when M is
sufficiently large.
Obviously, the optimal covering radius is larger than the optimal packing radius. It can be easily proved
by contradiction that the optimal covering radius is smaller than the twice of the optimal packing radius.
So we can establish the following relationship:
δ⋆p(M) ≤ δ
⋆
c (M) ≤ 2δ
⋆
p(M). (12)
From (11) and (12), we obtain the range of the optimal covering radius in Remark 2.
Remark 2. Using codebook of size M , the optimal covering radius satisfies that
κ1M
− 1
NtNj (1 + o(1)) ≤ δ⋆c (M) ≤ 2κ2M
− 1
NtNj (1 + o(1)).
When the codebook size is sufficiently large (i.e., when M is sufficiently large), the optimal covering
radius is scaled by the codebook size M such that
δ⋆c (M) ∝M
− 1
NtNj .
The optimal covering radius is closely related to our problem. As stated in Remark 1, if there are
S = (K−1)M+1 jammers, we can ensure that there exist K jamming channels aligned in an (Nr−Nt)-
dimensional subspace within distance δ⋆c (M). Therefore, we establish the following key lemma.
2f(n) = o(g(n)) means that f(n) ≤ cg(n) for any c > 0 when n is sufficiently large.
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Lemma 3. When there are S = (K−1)M+1 jammers, we can always pick K jammers whose alignment
measure is smaller than 2κ2M
− 1
NtNj (1 + o(1)), i.e.,
min
{s′1,...,s
′
K
}⊂[S]
q(Hs′1 , . . . ,Hs′K ) ≤ 2κ2M
− 1
NtNj (1 + o(1)),
where κ2 are constants invariant to M , and the term (1 + o(1)) can be ignored for large M .
Proof. Let Q⋆c = {Q⋆1, . . . ,Q⋆M} be the codebook that minimizes the covering radius, and consider M
metric balls B(Q⋆1, δ⋆c (M)), . . . , B(Q⋆M , δ⋆c (M)). By the definition, the union of the metric balls becomes
CNr . As stated in Remark 1, when there are S = (K−1)M+1 jammers, we can always pick K jamming
subspaces in the same metric ball. Let H(1), . . . ,H(K) be the K jamming subspaces in the same metric
ball, and Q⋆m be the center of the metric ball. Then, we obtain
min
{s′1,...,s
′
K
}⊂[S]
q(Hs′1 , . . . ,Hs′K ) ≤ q(H(1), . . . ,H(K))
(a)
≤ max
k∈[K]
dc(H(k),Q
⋆
m)
(b)
≤ δ⋆c (M)
(c)
≤ 2κ2M
− 1
NtNj (1 + o(1)),
where the inequality (a) is from the definition of the alignment measure given in (9), and the inequality
(b) holds because H(k) ∈ B(Q⋆m, δ⋆c (M)) for all k ∈ [K]. Also, the inequality (c) holds from Remark 2.
V. OPPORTUNISTIC JAMMER SELECTION FOR SECURE DOF
We recall the secure DoF of Bob given in (6):
Secure DoF = Nt − lim
P→∞
R−Bob
log2 P
. (13)
We need an appropriate jammer selection scheme to reduce the DoF loss from the jamming signals. In
this section, we propose two opportunistic jammer selection schemes. Firstly, we find the minimum DoF
loss jammer selection scheme to achieve the maximum secure DoF. Then, we propose the subspace-based
jammer selection scheme.
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A. Minimum DoF Loss Jammer Selection Scheme (OJS1)
In the minimum DoF loss jammer selection scheme, Bob directly minimizes the rate loss from the
jamming signals, i.e., R−Bob in (13). Correspondingly, the DoF loss is minimized. The rate loss from the
minimum DoF loss jammer selection at Bob denoted by R−(1)Bob is given by
R−(1)Bob = E
[
min
s′1,...,s
′
K
,V
log2
∣∣∣∣∣INt + PNjV†
( K∑
k=1
Hs′
k
H
†
s′
k
)
V
∣∣∣∣∣
]
(a)
= E
[
min
s′1,...,s
′
K
log2
Nr∏
n=Nr−Nt+1
[
1 +
P
Nj
λn
( K∑
k=1
Hs′
k
H
†
s′
k
)]]
, (14)
where the equality (a) is obtained using the postprocessing matrix
V = [vNr−Nt+1(A), . . . ,vNr(A)] ,
where A =
∑K
k=1Hs′kH
†
s′
k
, and λn(·) and vn(·) are the nth largest eigenvalue and corresponding eigen-
vector of the matrix, respectively. Thus, the selected jammers at Bob become
(s1, . . . , sK) = argmin
s′1,...,s
′
K
Nr∏
n=Nr−Nt+1
[
1 +
P
Nj
λn
(
K∑
k=1
Hs′
k
H
†
s′
k
)]
.
B. Subspace-based Jammer Selection Scheme (OJS2)
In this subsection, we propose the suboptimal jammer selection scheme using the jamming subspaces.
First of all, we find an upper bound of the minimum rate loss of Bob, i.e., (14), given by
R−(1)Bob = EH˜,Λ
[
min
s′1,...,s
′
K
,V
log2
∣∣∣∣∣INt + PNj
K∑
k=1
V†H˜s′
k
Λs′
k
H˜
†
s′
k
V
∣∣∣∣∣
]
(a)
≤ E
H˜
[
min
s′1,...,s
′
K
,V
EΛ log2
∣∣∣∣∣INt + PNj
K∑
k=1
V†H˜s′
k
Λs′
k
H˜
†
s′
k
V
∣∣∣∣∣
]
(b)
≤ E
H˜
[
min
s′1,...,s
′
K
,V
log2
∣∣∣∣∣INt + PNj
K∑
k=1
V†H˜s′
k
EΛ[Λs′
k
]H˜†s′
k
V
∣∣∣∣∣
]
= E
H˜
[
min
s′1,...,s
′
K
,V
log2
∣∣∣∣∣INt + P
K∑
k=1
V†H˜s′
k
H˜
†
s′
k
V
∣∣∣∣∣
]
, (15)
where H˜ ∈ CNr×Nj and Λ ∈ RNj×Nj are obtained from H ∈ CNr×Nj by compact singular value
decomposition of HH† (i.e., HH† = H˜ΛH˜†) where Λ is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements
are the unordered non-zero eigenvalues of HH†. Then, H˜ becomes the generator matrix of H. Note that
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the generator matrix H˜ for the matrix H is not unique, but any generator matrix yields the same H˜H˜†.
The inequality (a) is from the fact that the minimum of the averages is larger than the average of the
minimums. The inequality (b) holds from Jensen’s inequality and the independence between H˜ and Λ.
Finally, we obtain (15) from the fact that E[Λs′
k
] = NjINj [30].
In the subspace-based jammer selection scheme, we minimize the upper bound given in (15) denoted
by R−(2)Bob instead of (14). We can rewrite R−(2)Bob as
R−(2)Bob , EH˜
[
min
s′1,...,s
′
K
,V
log2
∣∣∣∣∣INt + P
K∑
k=1
V†H˜s′
k
H˜
†
s′
k
V
∣∣∣∣∣
]
= E
H˜
[
min
s′1,...,s
′
K
log2
Nr∏
n=Nr−Nt+1
[
1 + Pλn
( K∑
k=1
H˜s′
k
H˜
†
s′
k
)]]
(16)
by applying V = [vNr−Nt+1(B), . . . ,vNr(B)] in (15) where B =
∑K
k=1 H˜s′kH˜
†
s′
k
. Thus, the selected
jammers are given by
(s1, . . . , sK) = argmin
s′1,...,s
′
K
Nr∏
n=Nr−Nt+1
[
1 + Pλn
(
K∑
k=1
H˜s′
k
H˜
†
s′
k
)]
.
OJS1 considers the channel matrix itself so that the jammer selection criterion involves the channel
magnitude. As a result, OJS1 becomes the secure DoF optimal jammer selection scheme minimizing
the Bob’s DoF loss. On the other hand, OJS2 considers the subspace spanned by the channel matrix so
that all channel matrices spanning the same subspace are considered identical regardless of the channel
magnitude.
VI. SUFFICIENT JAMMER SCALING FOR TARGET SECURE DOF
In this section, we find a sufficient jammer scaling law for a target secure DoF. In previous section, we
proposed two jammer selection schemes which obtain the minimum rate loss R−(1)Bob and its upper bound
R−(2)Bob , respectively. From (6), the target secure DoF d ∈ (0, Nt] is obtained in both schemes when
lim
P→∞
R−(1)Bob
log2 P
= lim
P→∞
R−(2)Bob
log2 P
= Nt − d.
Since it is hard to directly find the required jammer scaling for the target secure DoF, we will find R−(3)Bob
as a further upper bound of R−(1)Bob and find the sufficient jammer scaling law for the target secure DoF
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d. This scaling ensures that
lim
P→∞
R−(1)Bob
log2 P
≤ lim
P→∞
R−(2)Bob
log2 P
≤ lim
P→∞
R−(3)Bob
log2 P
= Nt − d. (17)
The term R−(2)Bob given in (16) is upper bounded as follows
R−(2)Bob = EH˜
[
min
s′1,...,s
′
K
,V
log2
∣∣∣∣∣INt + P
K∑
k=1
V†H˜s′
k
H˜
†
s′
k
V
∣∣∣∣∣
]
(a)
≤ E
H˜
[
min
s′1,...,s
′
K
,V
Nt log2
(
1 +
P
Nt
K∑
k=1
tr
(
V†H˜s′
k
H˜
†
s′
k
V
))]
(b)
= E
H˜
[
min
s′
1
,...,s′
K
,
V∈GNr,Nt
(C)
Nt log2
(
1 +
P
Nt
K∑
k=1
d2c(Hs′k ,V
⊥)
)]
(c)
≤ E
H˜
[
min
s′1,...,s
′
K
Nt log2
(
1 +
P
Nt
K
[
q(Hs′1 , . . . ,Hs′K )
]2)]
(d)
≤ Nt log2
(
1 +
4κ22KP
Nt
⌊
S − 1
K − 1
⌋− 2
NtNj
)
+ o(1), (18)
where V ∈ GNr ,Nt(C) is the subspace formed by the postprocessing matrix V, and V⊥ ∈ GNr ,Nr−Nt(C)
is the orthogonal complement subspace of V. In the above equations, the inequality (a) is from Jensen’s
inequality such that log(αβ) ≤ 2 log[(α+β)/2], and the equality (b) holds from Lemma 1. The inequality
(c) holds because selecting the subspace V is equivalent to selecting the subspace V⊥, and it is satisfied
that
min
V⊥∈GNr,Nr−Nt (C)
K∑
k=1
d2c(Hs′k ,V
⊥) ≤ K
[
q(Hs′1, . . . ,Hs′K)
]2
from the definition of the alignment measure given in (9). Also, the inequality (d) is from Lemma 3 by
substituting M = ⌊(S − 1)/(K − 1)⌋. We define (18) as R−(3)Bob , i.e.,
R−(3)Bob , Nt log2
(
1 +
4κ22PK
Nt
⌊
S − 1
K − 1
⌋− 2
NtNj
)
.
Theorem 1. The sufficient number of jammers to ensure Bob’s rate loss smaller than ∆ is given by
S = (K − 1)
[
4κ22KP
Nt (2∆/Nt − 1)
]NtNj
2
+ 1. (19)
Proof. If R−(3)Bob = ∆, Bob can have rate loss smaller than ∆. By solving R−(3)Bob = ∆, we obtain (19).
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Theorem 2. The target secure DoF of d ∈ (0, Nt] is achieved when the number of jammers is scaled as
S ∝ P dNj/2.
Proof. As stated in (17), the target DoF of d is achieved when lim
P→∞
(
R−(3)Bob / log2 P
)
= Nt−d, equivalently,
lim
P→∞
Nt log2
(
1 +
4κ22KP
Nt
⌊
S − 1
K − 1
⌋− 2
NtNj
)
= log2 P
Nt−d.
This condition holds when S ∝ P dNj/2.
Interestingly, the scaling law of the required jammers in Theorem 2 is affected by neither the number of
selected jammers K nor the number of receive antennas Nr (but, necessarily, Nt+Nj ≤ Nr < Nt+KNj).
Remark 3. Theorem 2 implies that using single-antenna jammers is more efficient in terms of the minimum
required jammer scaling than using multi-antenna jammers for target secure DoF. That is, S ∝ P dNj/2 is
minimized when Nj = 1.
As shown in Theorem 1, the required number of jammers increases with the number of the selected
jammers to achieve a given rate loss; if the number of selected jammers increases from K to K + 1, the
number of required jammers to maintain Bob’s rate loss smaller than ∆ increases from S to
K
K − 1
(
K + 1
K
)NtNj
2
S
which becomes S when K is sufficiently large. However, it does not change the scaling law for the given
target secure DoF as shown in Theorem 2 because the secure DoF is defined for the asymptotic case that
P →∞.
More receive antennas are likely to be beneficial for jamming signal alignment because a larger number
of receive antennas increase the subspace dimensions where the jamming signals (or jamming subspaces)
should be aligned, i.e., Nr − Nt. However, a larger number of receive antennas also increase signal
space of each jamming signal, i.e., Nr, and thus make it harder to align all jamming signals together.
This counter-effect cancels the benefit of increased subspace dimensions for jamming signal alignment
and makes the scaling law independent of the number of receive antennas. For example, suppose that
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we can increase Bob’s receive antennas Nr to Nr + 1 while maintaining the antenna configuration of
Nt + Nj ≤ Nr + 1 < Nt + KNj . Although we have increased dimensions (Nr + 1 − Nt) for jamming
subspace alignment, each jamming subspace becomes Nj-dimensional subspaces in CNr+1. The alignment
of Nj-dimensional subspaces in CNr+1 is much more difficult than the alignment of Nj-dimensional
subspaces in CNr . The scaling law of the required number of jammers is unchanged due to this difficulty
in spite of the increased dimensions for jamming subspace alignment. These results and insights are
generalized by the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Any wireless communication system can achieve the secure DoF of d ∈ (0, Nt] via oppor-
tunistic jammer selection with a jammer scaling law S ∝ P d/2. In this case, each jammer should have
a single antenna, and (Nt + 1) antennas are enough for Bob’s receiver. We can increase the defensible
dimensions of the system as many as we want by increasing K to make the achievable DoF of Bob directly
become the secure DoF.
A. OJS with the Partial CSI
In this subsection, we show that Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 are still valid with secrecy outage probability
ǫ for practical partial CSI scenarios that CSI for Eve’s channel is not known to Alice. Since Eve’s CSI
is hard to know even when Eve’s presence is known, many schemes that work in the absence of Eve’s
CSI have been proposed [8], [31], [32]. The authors in [8] proposed relay chatting for half-duplexing
two-hop amplify-and-forward (AF) relay communication systems. In the relay chatting scheme, the best
relay forwards the received signal and the other relays send jamming signals over the null space of the
desired channel via distributed beamforming at each stage. Compared to the relay chatting scheme, each
jammer in our proposed scheme simply transmits an i.i.d. Gaussian signal; the selected jammers do not
require any CSI or joint transmission. Moreover, we consider the defensible dimension to prevent Eve’s
eavesdropping in multiple antenna configurations.
In Section III-B, we showed that the jamming signals make Eve’s DoF zero for each channel realization.
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In this case, Eve’s channel capacity given in (2) is saturated to
lim
P→∞
CEve = log2
∣∣∣∣∣∣INe +
Nj
Nt
G0G
†
0
(
K∑
k=1
GskG
†
sk
)−1∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (20)
Since the selected jammers are random to Eve, the distribution of limP→∞ CEve will be identical with that
of a random variable R defined by
R , log2
∣∣∣∣∣∣INe +
Nj
Nt
G0G
†
0
(
K∑
k=1
GkG
†
k
)−1∣∣∣∣∣∣ , (21)
which can be numerically found. We can choose a constant rate r to yield
Pr[R ≥ r] = ǫ, (22)
where ǫ ∈ [0, 1]. Then, using Wyner’s encoding scheme with two rates (RBob, r) instead of (RBob, CEve),
Bob can achieve the secure DoF
E
{
lim
P→∞
[RBob − r]
+
log2 P
}
= E
{
lim
P→∞
RBob
log2 P
}
with secrecy outage probability ǫ, which is the same as the achievable secure DoF with the knowledge
of CEve.
Obviously, in (22), the smaller ǫ requires the larger r, but it is independent of P . Therefore, we can
almost surely obtain the same target secure DoF by choosing sufficiently large r which makes ǫ ≈ 0.
Note that this result comes from the independency between the jamming signals and Eve’s CSI.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate our proposed opportunistic jammer selection schemes. Fig. 6 shows that Bob
can increase the achievable rate via jammer selection while maintaining the same average capacity of Eve’s
channel. The numbers of antennas at Alice, Bob, jammers, and Eve are assumed by (Nt, Nj, Nr, Ne) =
(2, 2, 4, 4), respectively, and Bob selects two jammers (i.e., K = 2) in the jammer group. In this case, the
number of Eve’s receive antennas does not exceed the defensible dimensions, i.e., Ne ≤ KNj , so that
Eve obtains zero DoF. We also consider the capacity maximizing jammer selection scheme at Bob for
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comparison. As shown in Fig. 6, the channel capacities of both Bob and Eve are saturated in the high
SNR region because the number of jammers is finite. However, at a fixed SNR, the achievable rate of Bob
increases with the number of candidate jammers, while Eve’s channel capacity remains unchanged. The
gap between the capacities of Bob and Eve increases with the number of candidate jammers, and results
in the secure DoF of Nt when S →∞. As the number of jammers increases, Bob can reduce the negative
effects of the jamming signals, and the channel capacity with jammers by the capacity maximizing jammer
selection will go to that without jamming signals. Since Eve’s capacity with jammers is saturated in the
high SNR region, Bob can obtain the secure DoF without Eve’s CSI as described in Section VI-A. In the
case that (Nt, Nj, Nr, Ne) = (2, 2, 4, 4) and K = 2, Fig. 7 shows the secrecy outage probability (i.e., ǫ)
when the Eve’s achievable rate is treated as a constant (i.e., r). This figure shows that the secrecy outage
probability decreases if the constant rate of Eve increases.
The achievable secrecy rates are plotted in Fig. 8 when Bob selects two jammers in the jammer group
with a scaled number of jammers. The number of antennas at each node is (Nt, Nj, Nr, Ne) = (1, 2, 3, 3).
In this case, the number of defensible dimensions of the security system is KNj = 4 and hence the Eve’s
DoF becomes zero. In Fig. 8, we consider the optimal jammer selection scheme at Alice with global
CSI to maximize the secrecy rate, while in our proposed jammer selection scheme Bob selects jammers
with only its own CSI. As a referential upper bound, we also consider the scheme of [27, p.189]. In the
referential scheme, Alice with (Nt +KNj) antennas steers beams with perfect CSIT and sends artificial
noise along with information-bearing messages without any help of jammers. On the other hand, Bob and
Eve have Nr and Ne antennas, respectively, as in our system model. As shown in Theorem 2, Bob can
obtain DoF of one when the number of jammers is scaled by S ∝ P dNj/2 = P . We consider two jammer
scalings S = P and S = 0.3P . In both cases, Bob obtains DoF of one which directly becomes secure
DoF. In Fig. 9, we consider two scenarios S = P and S = P 0.5 in the same configuration. As predicted
in Theorem 2, Bob obtains secure DoF of one and a half when S = P and S = P 0.5, respectively. Note
that the referential scheme [27, p.189] obtains much higher secrecy rate because Alice not only has more
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transmit antennas (i.e., Nt +KNj antennas) but also exploits perfect CSIT.
In Fig. 10, we consider the antenna configuration (Nt, Nj, Nr, Ne) = (2, 1, 3, 2) and plot the achievable
secrecy rates when Bob selects two jammers in the jammer group with a scaled numbers of jammers
S ∝ P and S ∝ P 0.5, respectively. As predicted in Theorem 2, Bob obtains secure DoF two and one
when S = P and S = P 0.5, respectively.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed the opportunistic jammer selection schemes to achieve the secure DoF in a
secure communication system aided by jammers. For the opportunistic jammer selection, we proposed two
selection criteria – the minimum DoF loss jammer selection and the subspace-based jammer selection. We
proved that the secure DoF can be obtained by aligning jamming signals in a small dimensional subspace
at Bob’s receiver through the opportunistic jammer selection. From the geometric interpretation, we found
the required jammer scaling laws to obtain target secure DoF at Bob’s receiver.
24
REFERENCES
[1] C. E. Shannon, “Communication theory of secrecy systems,” Bell Syst. Tech. J., vol. 28, pp. 656–715, 1949.
[2] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell Syst. Tech. J., vol. 54, no. 8, pp. 1355–1387, 1975.
[3] I. Csiszar and J. Korner, “Broadcast channels with confidential messages,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, pp. 339–348, May 1978.
[4] S. Goel and R. Negi, “Guaranteeing secrecy using artificial noise,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 7, no. 6, pp. 2180–2189, June
2008.
[5] J. Zhu, J. Mo, and M. Tao, “Cooperative secret communication with artificial noise in symmetric interference channel,” IEEE Commnun.
Lett., vol. 14, no. 10, pp. 885–887, Oct. 2010.
[6] S. Vasudevan, S. Adams, D. Goeckel, Z. Ding, D. Towsley, and K. Leung, “Multi-user diversity for secrecy in wireless networks,”
Information Theory and Applications Workshop, 2009.
[7] J. Chen, R. Zhang, L. Song, Z. Han, and B. Jiao, “Joint relay and jammer selection for secure two-way relay networks,” in Proc. IEEE
International Conference on Communications, Kyoto, Japan, June, 2011.
[8] Z. Ding, K. K. Leung, D. L. Goeckel, and D. Towsley, “Opportunistic relaying for secrecy communications: cooperative jamming vs.
relay chatting,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 10, no. 6, June 2011.
[9] T. Gou and S. A. Jafar, “On the secure degrees of freedom of wireless X networks,” in Proc. 46th Annual Allerton Conference on
Communication, Control and Computing, Sep. 2008.
[10] O. O. Koyluoglu, H. El Gamal, L. Lifeng, and H. V. Poor, “On the secure degrees of freedom in the K-user Gaussian interference
channel,” in Proc. International Symposium on Information Theory, pp. 384-388, July 2008.
[11] O. O. Koyluoglu, H. El Gamal, L. Lifeng, and H. V. Poor, “Interference alignment for secrecy,” IEEE Trans. Info. Theory, vol. 57, no.
6, pp. 3323–3332, June 2011.
[12] S. A. Jafar and S. Shamai, “Degrees of freedom region for the MIMO X channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54, no. 1, pp. 151–170,
Jan. 2008.
[13] V. R. Cadambe and S. A. Jafar, “Interference alignment and the degrees of freedom for the K user interference channel,” IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory, vol. 54, no. 8, pp. 3425–3441, Aug. 2008.
[14] P. Viswanath, D. Tse, and R. Laroia, “Opportunistic beamforming using dumb antennas,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 48, no. 6, pp.
1277–1294, June 2002.
[15] Q. Zhou and H. Dai, “Asymptotic analysis on the interaction between spatial diversity and multiuser diversity in wireless networks,”
IEEE Trans. Sig. Proc., vol. 55, no. 8, pp. 4271–4283, Aug. 2007.
[16] M. Sharif and B. Hassibi, “On the capacity of MIMO broadcast channels with partial side information,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol.
51, no. 2, pp. 506–522, Feb. 2005.
[17] Y. Huang and B. Rao, “Random beamforming with heterogeneous users and selective feedback: individual sum rate and individual
scaling laws,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 12, no. 5, pp. 2080–2090, May 2013.
[18] J.-P. Hong and W. Choi, “Throughput characteristics by multiuser diversity in a cognitive radio system,” IEEE Trans. Sig. Proc., vol.
59, no. 8, pp. 3749–3763, Aug. 2011.
25
[19] W. Choi and J. G. Andrews, “The capacity gainfrom intercell scheduling in multi-antenna systems,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun.,
vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 714–725, Feb. 2008.
[20] J. H. Lee and W. Choi, “Opportunistic interference alignment by receiver selection in a K-user 1× 3 SIMO interference channel,” in
Proc. IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, Houston, TX, Dec. 2011.
[21] J. H. Lee and W. Choi, “On the achievable DoF and user scaling law of opportunistic interference alignment in 3-transmitter MIMO
interference channels,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 12, no. 6, pp. 2743–2753, June 2013.
[22] J. H. Lee, W. Choi, and B. D. Rao, “Multiuser diversity in interfering broadcast channels: achievable degrees of freedom and user
scaling law,” to appear, IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun.
[23] X. He and A. Yener, “Providing secrecy with lattice codes,” in Proc. 46th Allerton Conf. on Commun., Contr., and Comput., Sep. 2008.
[24] R. Bassily and S. Ulukus, “Ergodic secret alignment,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 1594–1611, Mar. 2012.
[25] B. Nazer, M. Gastpar, S. A. Jafar, and S. Vishwanath, “Ergodic interference alignment,” in Proc. IEEE Symp. Inf. Theory, pp. 1769–1773,
June 2009.
[26] J. Xie and S. Ulukus, “Secure degrees of freedom of the Gaussian wiretap channel with helpers,” in Proc. 50th Allerton Conf. on
Commun., Contr., and Comput., Oct. 2012.
[27] M. Bloch and J. Barros, Physical-Layer Security: From Information Theory to Security Engineering. Cambridge University Press, 2011.
[28] Y. Liang, H. V. Poor, and S. Shamai, “Information theoretic security,” Found. and Trends in Commun. and Inf. Theory, vol. 5, no. 4-5,
pp. 355–580, 2008.
[29] I. Bengtsson, W. Bruzda, A˚. Ericsson, J.-A˚. Larsson, W. Tadej, and K. ˙Zyczkowski, “MUBs and hadamards of order six,” J. Math.
Phys. 48, 052106 (2007), arXiv:quant-ph/0610161
[30] N. Ravindran and N. Jindal, “Limited feedback-based block diagonalization for the MIMO broadcast channel,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas
Commun., vol. 26, no. 8, pp. 1473–1482, Oct. 2008.
[31] P. K. Gopala, L. Lai, and H. El Gamal, “On the secrecy capacity of fading channels,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54, no. 10, pp.
4687–4698, Oct. 2008.
[32] X. Zhou, R. K. Ganti, J. G. Andrews, and A. Hjørungnes, “On the throughput cost of physical layer security in decentralized wireless
networks,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 10, no. 8, pp. 2764–2775, Aug. 2011.
[33] W. Dai, Y. Liu, and B. Rider, “Quantization bounds on Grassmann manifolds and applications to MIMO communications,” IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory, vol. 54, no. 3, pp. 1108–1123, Mar. 2008.
[34] A. Barg and D. Y. Nogin “Bounds on packings of spheres in the Grassmann manifold,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 48, no. 9, pp.
2450–2454, Sep. 2002.
[35] O. Henkel “Sphere-packing bounds in the Grassmann and Stiefel manifolds,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 51, no. 10, pp. 3445–3456,
Oct. 2005.
[36] A. Ashikhmin, G. Cohen, M. Krivelevich, and S. Litsyn, “Bounds on distance distribution in codes of known size,” IEEE Trans. Inf.
Theory, vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 259–264, Jan. 2005.
[37] B. Mondal and R. W. Heath, Jr., “A diversity guarantee and SNR performance for unitary limited feedback mimo systems,” EURASIP
J. Applied Signal Processing, vol. 8, Jan. 2008.
26
Bob
Eve
Alice
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
…Nt
Nr
…
…
Ne
…
…
Nj
Selected 
K jammers
Jammer 
Group
(S jammers )
Fig. 1. System model.
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Fig. 2. The basic concept of opportunistic jammer selection. The jamming signals from the selected jammers are aligned at Bob but not at
Eve.
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H2
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Fig. 3. There are total S points on the sphere. Each point represents the subspace formed by each jammer.
(a) Packing radius (b) Covering radius
Fig. 4. Graphical representation of the packing radius and the covering radius on the sphere. The metric balls at M points pack or cover
the sphere.
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Fig. 5. There are S = (K − 1)M + 1 jamming subspaces (points) and M metric balls covering the sphere. There exist a metric ball that
contains K jamming subspaces.
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Fig. 6. Achievable rates of Bob when the number of jammers is fixed. (Nt, Nj , Nr, Ne) = (2, 2, 4, 4) and K = 2.
29
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Constant rate for Eve (r)
Se
cr
ec
y 
ou
ta
ge
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
 (ε
)
SNR 10dB
SNR 5dB SNR 15dB
Fig. 7. Secrecy outage probability ǫ when the Eve’s achievable rate is treated as a constant r. (Nt, Nj , Nr, Ne) = (2, 2, 4, 4) and K = 2.
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Fig. 8. The achievable secrecy rates for various jammer selection schemes when (Nt, Nj , Nr, Ne) = (1, 2, 3, 3). Bob selects two jammers
in the jammer groups of S = P and S = 0.3P jammers, respectively.
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Fig. 9. The achievable secrecy rates for various jammer selection schemes when (Nt, Nj , Nr, Ne) = (1, 2, 3, 3). Bob selects two jammers
in the jammer groups of S = P and S = P 0.5 jammers, respectively.
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Fig. 10. The achievable secrecy rates for various jammer selection schemes when (Nt, Nj , Nr , Ne) = (2, 1, 3, 2). Bob selects two jammers
in the jammer groups of S = P and S = P 0.5 jammers, respectively.
